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Within psychology and other disciplines, group decision making is a much-studied topic. 
However, the conditions in which groups do not decide but rather refuse to choose among 
available options have not been studied systematically. This research begins to fi ll this void, 
studying the effects of the initial opinions of group members on group decision refusal. Based 
on the common knowledge effect, it is predicted and found that groups will often refuse all 
available options when group members are initially negative about the options. It is further 
found that, when initial opinions are negative, positive information entered during group 
discussion does not have much impact. The implications of this negativity bias are discussed.
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Many important decisions are made in groups. 
Indeed, collective decision making has two im-
portant advantages over individual decision 
making. First, because a group of people in 
general will have more information available 
to it than any of its members separately, groups 
have the potential to make a better choice. 
Second, group decisions might yield greater 
acceptance than individual decisions, which 
can have the advantage that people are more 
committed to the decision (Stasser & Titus, 
1985; Vroom & Yetton, 1973). Group decision 
making has therefore long been a topic for 
psychological research (for a recent review, see 
Kerr & Tindale, 2004).
Despite this long tradition of psychological re-
search, one topic has received limited attention. 
This is the topic of group decisions that do not 
get made. In the typical group decision-making 
study, groups simply have to make a choice 
among the available alternatives, because a ‘no 
choice’ option is not available. One exception is 
mock jury decisions, in which juries can be ‘hung’ 
when they do not reach agreement on a verdict. 
There has been some interest in predicting 
when juries will be hung (Kerr & MacCoun, 
1985). However, in many other real life decisions, 
it often is possible to refuse making decisions 
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as well. Indeed, common experience suggests 
that meetings can drag on forever without any 
decisions being made, that decisions are often 
deferred to later meetings, that groups refuse 
to commit themselves to a chosen alternative, 
or that groups appoint committees to ‘investigate 
the need for further investigation’. As far as I 
know, these topics have not been the subject of 
systematic research.
In this article, I begin to study group decisions 
that do not get made. In particular, I focus on 
one type of indecision, which Corbin (1980) has 
called ‘decision refusal’. In the case of group 
decision refusal, all currently available alter-
natives are rejected, and instead the group 
decides to invest further resources to look for 
more alternatives. I argue that decision refusal 
in groups becomes likely when group members 
enter the discussion with a negative view on all 
available options. I further argue that this nega-
tive view is likely to persist even after positive 
information becomes available during discussion. 
As a consequence, groups will often refuse to 
choose, even though the decision options might 
be perceived as adequate had all information 
been known from the beginning.
Decision refusal in groups
Decision refusal
Corbin (1980) has provided a theoretical frame-
work to think about decisions that do not get 
made. She argued that in different stages of 
the decision process different forms of not 
deciding occur. In the early stages, a decision 
opportunity might not be identifi ed as such 
and the decision processes will consequently 
not be started. Corbin calls this inattention. In 
the middle stages, when decision makers are 
evaluating the available alternatives, decision 
makers may delay their decision. According to 
Corbin, delay occurs when decision makers are 
uncertain about which of the alternatives they 
prefer, for example, because alternatives are close 
in attractiveness (also see Dhar, 1997; Tversky 
& Shafi r, 1992). Decisions consequently are 
delayed in order to resolve preference uncertainty 
(e.g. by searching for more information about 
the available options). Finally, in the end stages 
of a decision, a decision maker may think that 
none of the available alternatives is suffi ciently 
attractive, which may lead to refusal of all avail-
able options (and therefore to no choice being 
made). Rather than trying to establish which 
of the currently available alternatives is best, 
the decision maker rejects all available alterna-
tives and decides to invest resources to identify 
more alternatives (e.g. go to a different store 
to look at more products, interview more job 
candidates).
In the present article, the focus is on decision 
refusal in groups, addressing the question: When 
will groups refuse all available options, and rather 
decide to invest further resources to identify 
more options? This question is highly relevant, 
because in many decision situations initial choice 
sets are incomplete, which offers the possibil-
ity to identify more options. Decision refusal 
is not by defi nition a maladaptive response. 
Indeed, if all currently available options are 
unattractive, it might be better to look for more 
options. However, there is a point after which 
the investments in the search for more options 
will no longer pay off. Thus, adaptive decision 
making should depend on the balance between 
the costs of searching and the potential bene-
fi ts of fi nding a superior alternative (also see 
Tversky & Shafi r, 1992), and refusal is maladap-
tive when adequate alternatives are rejected 
while search costs are high. It should further 
be noted that decision refusal is not the same 
as choosing the status quo. When choosing the 
status quo, the decision process is ended, whereas 
when refusing all currently available options the 
decision process is extended and resources are 
used to search for further alternatives.
Social decision schemes, information sharing 
and decision refusal
Previous work on mock jury decisions suggests 
that juries can be hung, implying that no decision 
is reached, when there are opposing factions 
who do not give in. Kerr and MacCoun (1985), 
for example, manipulated jury size, polling 
method (public or private) and closeness of 
the case. They found that public polling led to 
more hung juries, especially when juries were 
large and cases were close. In larger juries and 
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with closer cases there is a higher likelihood that 
jurors hold different opinions (i.e. some favour 
guilty, other favour not guilty). With public 
polling methods, jurors are less likely to give 
in, because they feel more committed to their 
original verdict, leading to more hung juries. 
Thus, it seems that preference diversity might be 
one antecedent of group indecision, especially 
if group members are not likely to concede to 
others (also see Nijstad & Kaps, 2008).
However, to complement this picture, in this 
article I derive another prediction on when 
groups might refuse to choose. This prediction 
is based on social decision scheme (SDS) theory 
(Davis, 1973), and work on collective informa-
tion sampling and the common knowledge 
effect (Gigone & Hastie, 1993, 1997; Larson, 
Foster-Fishman, & Keys, 1994; Stasser & Titus, 
1985, 1987). To derive these predictions, it is 
assumed that decisions refusal is an additional 
choice option (e.g. choose A, choose B, or refuse 
both A and B) that will be taken when all other 
available options are judged to be insuffi ciently 
attractive (cf. Anderson, 2003; Corbin, 1980; 
Dhar, 1996).
SDS theory models group decisions with two 
parameters, preference distributions and social 
decision schemes. Preference distributions 
refl ect how many group members support each 
of the available alternatives. The SDS specifi es 
the relation between these preference dis-
tributions and group decisions. For example, 
with a ‘majority wins’ SDS, the group would 
choose option A when at least a majority of group 
members favours A. Indeed, one of the most 
robust fi ndings in group decision-making re-
search is that majority wins is a very dominant 
SDS, and is used in many decision-making 
groups (Stasser, 1999). Based on this, one would 
predict that a group chooses the refusal option 
when a majority of group members initially has 
a preference for decision refusal.
Groups that choose on the basis of a majority 
wins SDS will often do well: if most people inde-
pendently prefer a certain option, it is likely to 
be a good option. However, groups can some-
times choose a suboptimal alternative as a conse-
quence of using a majority wins SDS. This is 
the case in hidden profi le situations (Stasser & 
Titus, 1985). In hidden profi les, group members 
before the discussion have some information 
in common with the other group members 
(shared information) and some information 
that is uniquely available to them (unshared 
information). Based on this incomplete set of 
information, each group member before dis-
cussion comes to prefer a certain alternative. 
However, they would recognize that alternative 
as suboptimal when all information is taken into 
account, because the unshared information 
points towards another alternative. Thus, only 
with a full exchange of (unshared) information 
during discussion will group members recognize 
that their initial preferences were incorrect. 
Unfortunately, much research has shown that 
group discussions are often biased towards 
shared information, that unshared information 
is discussed less, and that groups therefore often 
fail to discover the hidden profi le (Larson et al., 
1994; Stasser, Taylor, & Hanna, 1989; Stasser & 
Titus, 1985, 1987).
Further, even when information is fully dis-
cussed, groups often do not discover the hid-
den profile (Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 
2003; Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001). The 
reason is that, after a preference is formed, new 
information that becomes available is evalu-
ated in a biased way. Thus, Greitemeyer and 
Schulz-Hardt (2003) found that, in a hidden 
profi le situation, preference-consistent informa-
tion evaluation kept decision quality low despite 
a full exchange of information. This is one of 
the causes of the common knowledge effect: the 
effect that shared information has a bigger impact 
on choice than unshared information (Gigone & 
Hastie, 1993, 1997). Shared information fi rst has 
a bigger impact on pre-discussion preferences, 
because by defi nition it is available to all group 
members and thus has an impact on each group 
member’s preference. Second, new information 
(i.e. unshared information) that comes up 
during group discussion is often evaluated in 
a biased way, so it does not have much impact 
on fi nal choices.
Based on the common knowledge effect and 
SDS theory, one can make predictions on group 
decision refusal. It is possible to create biased 
information sets, in which negative information 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(4)
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about decision options is shared, whereas all 
positive information is unshared. As a result, 
group members will come to the discussion with 
a negative view on all decision options, and a 
preference for decision refusal (i.e. take none 
of the options). During discussion, they fail to 
discuss unshared positive information, and if 
positive information is discussed, it does not 
have much impact on choice. Thus, groups will 
often take the refusal option when most mem-
bers initially favour refusal (i.e. a majority wins 
SDS is applied). However, when all positive and 
negative information is be available to group 
members from the start, they will not take the 
refusal option.
The present study
In the present experiment, three ways of dis-
tributing information among group mem-
bers were used to manipulate pre-discussion 
preferences for decision refusal. In all con-
ditions, the group as a whole received the same 
information, but this was distributed in three 
different ways across group members. In con-
dition 1 (full information), every group member 
received full information before discussion. 
This condition can be seen as a control condition, 
and can be used to see whether groups choose 
or refuse when full information is available from 
the start, and thus whether alternatives (given 
full information) are perceived to be adequate. 
In condition 2 (positive bias), group members 
received biased profi les, in which all group 
members received all the positive information 
about each alternative, but all negative infor-
mation was unshared. This should create a 
relatively positive view on the alternatives before 
discussion. In condition 3 (negative bias) this 
was reversed, and all group members received all 
negative information before discussion, whereas 
positive information was unshared. This should 
create a negative view on the alternatives before 
the discussion.
The following predictions are tested. First, 
compared with the full information condition 
and the positive bias condition, group members 
will be more negative about the alternatives 
and will more often be in favour of decision 
refusal before the discussion (Hypothesis 1). 
Second, because in the positive bias condition 
positive information is shared and negative 
information unshared, whereas in the negative 
bias condition this is reversed, it is expected that 
more positive than negative information will 
be discussed in the positive bias condition and 
more negative than positive information in 
the negative bias condition (Hypothesis 2). In 
the full information condition, no systematic 
bias is expected. Third, because of more nega-
tive initial views and a bias in the discussion 
towards negative information (Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2), more groups in the negative bias 
condition than in the other conditions will choose 
the refusal option (Hypothesis 3). The effect of 
condition on group choice will be mediated by 
pre-discussion preference distribution and infor-
mation exchange (Hypothesis 4).
Method
Participants
Participants were 90 students (18 males and 
66 females, 6 participants did not indicate their 
gender) of the University of Amsterdam, who 
participated in 30 three-person groups. They 
either received course credit or were paid €7 
for their participation. The average age of the 
participants was 20.36 years old (SD = 2.35).
Design and materials
There were three conditions: a condition with 
complete information, a condition with posi-
tively biased information, and a condition with 
negatively biased information. Participants were 
randomly assigned to conditions and groups, with 
10 groups in each condition. Conditions differed 
from each other only in the way information was 
distributed among the group members.
Participants had to decide among three female 
candidates who had applied for a teaching posi-
tion at the department of psychology. Before 
the group discussion, they individually received 
information about the three candidates, con-
sisting of information for each candidate on 
six attributes. These attributes were pre-tested 
for importance in a sample of 32 students from 
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the same population as the main study. The six 
attributes, with average importance ratings (1, not 
important to 7, very important) from the pre-test 
in parentheses, were: clarity (6.53), enthusiasm 
(6.31), patience (5.78), conscientiousness (5.66), 
teaching experience (4.53) and university grades 
(3.53). Each of the three candidates was given 
three positive (e.g. is very enthusiastic when 
teaching) and three negative attributes (e.g. has 
no teaching experience). These attributes were 
matched for importance, in such a way that the 
three candidates were approximately equally 
attractive.
The group as a whole always received the same 
(complete) information. However, I created 
three conditions by using three different ways 
of information distribution among the three 
group members (see Table 1). In condition 1, 
each group member received complete infor-
mation about all the candidates (complete 
information condition). In condition 2 (positive 
bias condition), all positive information about 
the candidates was shared and was given to all 
group members. However, the negative infor-
mation was unshared, and each piece of negative 
information was given to only one group member. 
In condition 3 (negative bias condition), this was 
reversed, so that all negative information was 
given to all group members, whereas positive 
information was unshared and given to only 
one group member.
Procedure
Participants were fi rst seated individually, and 
read a general introduction. They had to im-
agine that they were member of a three-person 
selection committee that had to decide whom to 
hire for a teaching position at the department 
of psychology. They were told that there were 
three candidates, who had all fi nished their 
master’s degree at a Dutch university. They had 
to decide, together with two other participants, 
whom to hire. However, they were told that it 
was also possible not to hire anybody, but to 
look for further candidates, and this was the 
refusal option. It was emphasized that they 
should only do this when they really thought 
that none of the current candidates was suitable 
for the position. They further read that, in real 
life, looking for further candidates is expensive 
and time-consuming. They were thus instructed 
to hire a candidate when they thought she was 
suitable, and only reject all candidates when they 
really thought that none of them was suitable 
for the job.
After this general instruction, participants indi-
vidually received the candidate profi les. They had 
six minutes to study the profi les, and were told 
that they could not refer to these profi les dur-
ing the later group discussion. They further read 
that it was possible that other group members 
had information different from their own. 
After six minutes, the experimenter collected 
Table 1. Information distribution in the three conditions
Condition
Group 
member Candidate
Complete information
(all information shared)
Positive bias (negative
information unshared)
Negative bias (positive 
information unshared)
1 A 1+, 2–, 3+, 4–, 5+, 6– 1+, 2–, 3+, 5+ 2–, 4–, 5+, 6–
B 1–, 2+, 3–, 4+, 5–, 6+ 2+, 4+, 5–, 6+ 1–, 2+, 3–, 5–
C 1+, 2–, 3–, 4+, 5–, 6+ 1+, 3–, 4+, 6+ 1+, 2–, 3–, 5–
2 A 1+, 2–, 3+, 4–, 5+, 6– 1+, 3+, 4–, 5+ 2–, 3+, 4–, 6–
B 1–, 2+, 3–, 4+, 5–, 6+ 2+, 3–, 4+, 6+ 1–, 3–, 4+, 5–
C 1+, 2–, 3–, 4+, 5–, 6+ 1+, 2–, 4+, 6+ 2–, 3–, 5–, 6+
3 A 1+, 2–, 3+, 4–, 5+, 6– 1+, 3+, 5+, 6– 1+, 2–, 4–, 6–
B 1–, 2+, 3–, 4+, 5–, 6+ 1–, 2+, 4+, 6+ 1–, 3–, 5–, 6+
C 1+, 2–, 3–, 4+, 5–, 6+ 1+, 4+, 5–, 6+ 2–, 3–, 4+, 5–
Note : 1, clarity; 2, enthusiasm; 3, patience; 4, conscientiousness; 5, experience; 6, grades. Positive information 
is indicated by +, negative information by –. For example, 1+ means that the candidate scores high on the 
attribute ‘clarity.’ Unshared information is given in bold.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 11(4)
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the profi les and distributed a pre-discussion 
questionnaire. Participants were asked what 
their individual decision at that moment would 
be (hire candidate A, B or C, or not hire any 
candidate), and they were asked to rate each 
candidate’s attractiveness.
Next, they received a follow-up instruction. 
They were told that they would participate in a 
group discussion, and that they should jointly 
decide whom to hire. It was repeated that they 
should hire a candidate when they thought she 
was suitable, but could also decide not to hire 
any of the candidates but look for further can-
didates. Again it was emphasized that this would 
cost additional time and money. They were next 
seated in one room, and were provided with 
a group decision sheet on which they could 
indicate their decision. All group discussions 
were videotaped. When the group had reached 
a decision, the participants were separated and 
individually fi lled out a post-experimental ques-
tionnaire. After that, they were debriefed, paid 
and dismissed.
Dependent variables
The main dependent variable was group choice, 
coded dichotomously as either choice (i.e. hire 
candidate A, B or C) or refusal (hire none of 
them, but look for further candidates).
For each group, group composition in terms 
of pre-discussion preferences was established, 
using the pre-discussion questionnaire. I distin-
guished between groups with no, one, two and 
three members in favour of refusal. In the pre-
discussion questionnaire, the three candidates 
were each also rated on three 7-point scales (1, 
completely disagree to 7, completely agree) to assess 
suitability for the job (e.g. ‘candidate A would be 
a good teacher’). Cronbach’s α for candidates 
A, B and C were .95, .92 and .94, respectively. 
Per candidate, the three items were therefore 
averaged in an index of job suitability.
Video recordings were coded for the exchange 
of information and the exchange of preferences. 
For each item of information that was available 
about the candidates, a coder who was blind to 
conditions and hypotheses coded whether or 
not it was mentioned during the discussion. 
Further, the coder tallied how often attractions for 
a certain candidate or aversions against a certain 
candidate were expressed. To establish intercoder 
reliability, a second coder independently coded 
the recordings of 10 groups. The coders agreed 
in 93.5% of the cases that a certain piece of 
information had been mentioned or not. The 
reliability of the number of times an attraction 
or aversion was expressed was established with 
the intraclass correlation, which was .81. Given 
these high reliabilities, the data from the fi rst 
coder were used.
In the post-experimental questionnaire, par-
ticipants were asked to give their own, individual 
preference after the discussion, as well as the 
degree to which they agreed with the group’s 
choice. Two items were used (e.g. ‘I agree with 
the group decision’) and they were averaged into 
a measure of agreement (Cronbach’s α = .85). 
They were further asked to rate each candidate’s 
suitability as a teacher, with the same items as in 
the pre-discussion questionnaire. Cronbach’s α 
for candidates A, B and C respectively were .93, 
.92 and .95. Finally, two items measured whether 
new information came up during discussion 
(e.g. ‘others mentioned information that I did 
not have’), and Cronbach’s α was .94. Before 
analysis, all post-discussion data was aggregated 
to the group level, by taking the average of the 
three group members.
Results
Pre-discussion preferences and candidate 
ratings
One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) showed 
that information distribution reliably affected 
the number of group members in favour of 
refusal before the discussion, F(2, 27) = 15.96, 
p < .001, η2 = .54 (see Table 2). Not a single 
group member initially favoured refusal in the 
positive bias condition, and on average 0.40 of 
three members favoured refusal in the com-
plete information condition. The negative bias 
condition differed reliably from both other 
conditions (Tukey post-hoc test, p < .01), with 
an average of 1.4 members per group preferring 
refusal before discussion. This resulted in the 
following preference distributions: in the full 
information condition, six groups had no group 
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member in favour of refusal, and in four groups 
one member was in favour of refusal; in the 
positive bias condition no group member was 
in favour of the refusal option; in the negative 
bias condition, there was one group with no 
member preferring refusal, fi ve groups with 
one member preferring refusal, three groups 
with two members preferring refusal, and 
one group with three members in favour of 
refusal. These differences were signifi cant, χ2(6, 
N = 30) = 19.84, p = .003, Cramer’s V = .58.
Candidate pre-discussion suitability ratings were 
analysed with a 3 (condition) × 3 (candidate) 
mixed-model ANOVA, with candidate as a 
within-participants variable (see Table 3). This 
yielded the expected main effect of condition, 
F(2, 87) = 37.08, p < .001, η2 = .46, showing 
that across candidates ratings were lower in the 
negative bias condition (M = 3.10) than in the 
full information condition (M = 4.33) and the 
positive bias condition (M = 4.65; Tukey post-hoc 
test, both p < .001). The full information and 
positive bias conditions did not differ (p = .22). 
There was a marginally signifi cant main effect 
for candidate, F(2, 86) = 2.87, p = .06, η2 = .06 
(Mcandidate A = 4.25; MB = 3.86; MC = 3.97). There 
also was an unanticipated interaction between 
condition and candidate, F(4, 172) = 3.93, 
p = .004, η2 = .08. The difference between the 
conditions was signifi cant for candidate A, F(2, 
87) = 36.91, p < .001, η2 = .46 and candidate C, 
F(2, 87) = 23.41, p < .001, η2 = .35, but not for 
candidate B, F(2, 87) = 1.82, p = .17, η2 = .04. 
In general, however, it can be concluded that 
participants in the negative bias condition had 
a less favourable opinion about the candidates, 
and more often favoured the refusal option. 
Thus, Hypothesis 1 was confi rmed.
Video recordings
For one group, no video recording was available 
(due to equipment failure), leaving 29 groups 
for these analyses. Discussion time was measured 
using the video recordings, and ANOVA 
showed no differences between conditions, 
F(2, 26) = 0.59, p = .56, η2 = .05 (see Table 2). 
Further, a distinction was made between positive 
and negative information that came up during 
discussion, and information exchange was 
analysed with a 3 (condition) × 2 (information: 
positive or negative) mixed-model ANOVA, 
with the information variable as a within-groups 
variable. This analysis did not yield signifi cant 
effects. There was no main effect of information, 
and on average as many positive (M = 5.97) as 
negative (M = 6.28) items of information were 
mentioned, F(2, 26) = 0.47, p = .50, η2 = .02. 
There also was no overall main effect of 
Table 2. Dependent variables by condition
            Condition
Dependent variable Full information Positive bias Negative bias
Pre-discussion refusal (No. group 
members)
 0.40a (.52)  0.00a (.00)  1.40b (.84)
Group refusal (%) 20% 10% 60%
Discussion time (min.)  8.93 (4.61)  7.06 (3.33)  7.38 (3.87)
Video recordings:
 Positive items mentioned  5.22 (2.59)  6.00 (2.11)  6.60 (2.01)
 Negative items mentioned  5.56 (2.35)  7.40 (1.35)  5.80 (2.39)
 Statement of attraction  5.56 (3.17)  5.50 (2.39)  3.20 (2.39)
 Statement of aversion  2.33 (2.18)  1.20 (1.03)  1.50 (2.22)
Post-discussion questionnaire:
 New information  2.33a (1.02)  6.07b (0.47)  5.17b (1.36)
 Agreement with group decision  5.95 (0.37)  5.95 (0.36)  6.13 (0.53)
Post discussion agreement (No. group 
members)
 2.56 (0.53)  2.70 (0.44)  2.62 (0.52)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Means not sharing the same superscript differ reliably (p < .05) 
in a Tukey post-hoc test.
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condition, F(2, 26) = 1.31, p = .29, η2 = .09, and 
no condition by information interaction, F(2, 
26) = 2.02, p = .15, η2 = .13. Thus, although in 
the positive bias condition positive information 
was shared and negative information unshared, 
whereas this was reversed in the negative bias 
condition, there were no reliable biases in the 
information that was mentioned during dis-
cussion, and Hypothesis 2 should be rejected. 
Surprisingly, the means were even in the op-
posite direction (see Table 2), with more nega-
tive than positive information being discussed 
in the positive bias condition, and more positive 
than negative information discussed in the 
negative bias condition. This is discussed in 
the Discussion.
The number of times an attraction or aversion 
was mentioned was analysed with a 3 (con-
dition) × 2 (statement: attraction or aversion) 
mixed ANOVA, with statement as a within-groups 
variable (Table 2). This analysis yielded a main 
effect of statement, F(1, 26) = 25.96, p < .001, 
η2 = .50, showing that on average more often 
attractions (M = 4.72) than aversions (M = 1.66) 
were expressed. There was a marginally signifi cant 
effect of condition, F(2, 26) = 2.74, p = .08, 
η2 = .17. Across attractions and aversions, some-
what more statements were made in the full 
information condition (M = 3.94) than in the 
negative bias condition (M = 2.35; Tukey post 
hoc test, p = .07). The positive bias condition was 
in between (M = 3.35) and did not differ from 
either of the other conditions. The condition 
by statement interaction was not signifi cant, 
F(2, 26) = 1.62, p = .22, η2 = .11.
Overall, the analyses of the video recordings 
thus show no large systematic biases in the 
content of the discussion. Differences among 
conditions in choice behaviour do therefore 
not seem to have been caused by biases during 
discussion.
Group decision and mediation analysis
Group decision was analysed with a chi-square 
test of frequencies, which yielded a signifi cant 
effect of condition, χ2(2, N = 30) = 6.67, p = .04, 
Cramer’s V = .47. In the full information con-
dition 20% of the groups preferred refusal, in 
the positive bias condition this was 10%. However, 
in the negative bias condition 60% of the groups 
did not choose any of the candidates (see Table 2). 
This confi rms Hypothesis 3.
It is likely that group choices largely refl ect 
pre-discussion preferences of group members. 
Indeed, the number of group members with 
a pre-discussion preference for refusal was a 
signifi cant predictor of group choice, χ2(3, 
N = 30) = 12.07, p = .007, Cramer’s V = .63. Two 
of 17 groups (12%) without any group member 
preferring refusal eventually chose to hire none 
of the candidates. Three of nine groups (33%) 
with one member in favour of refusal rejected 
all three alternatives. All four groups with a 
majority of two or unanimity in favour of refusal 
eventually decided not to hire any candidate. It 
thus appears that group decisions strongly refl ect 
pre-discussion preference distributions.
It was predicted (Hypothesis 4) that there might 
be two mediators for the effect of condition on 
group choice: pre-discussion preferences for 
refusal and a bias during discussion towards 
negative information. However, because there 
were signifi cant differences between conditions 
in the number of group members that preferred 
refusal before the discussion, but not in the 
information that was exchanged during the 
discussion, only pre-discussion preferences 
qualify as a potential mediator. To test for this, 
a series of regression analyses were performed 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986). Because there were no 
differences between the complete information 
and positive bias conditions, these were taken 
together, and a dummy variable was created 
comparing these two conditions (coded 0) 
with the negative bias condition (coded 1). In 
a logistic regression, this dummy variable had 
a signifi cant effect on group choice, B = 2.14, 
SE = 0.90, Wald = 5.66, p = .02. A linear regression 
further yielded a signifi cant effect of this dummy 
variable on the potential mediator (the number 
of group members initially favouring refusal), 
B = 1.20, SE = 0.23, t = 5.29, p < .001. Finally, 
when both the dummy variable and the mediator 
were regressed on group choice in a logistic 
regression, the dummy variable no longer had a 
signifi cant effect, B = 0.29, SE = 1.25, Wald = 0.05, 
p > .80, whereas the mediator had a signifi cant 
effect, B = 1.92, SE = 0.97, Wald = 3.89, p < .05. A 
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Sobel test indicated that mediation was (margin-
ally) signifi cant, Z = 1.85, p = .06. Thus, the effect 
of condition on group choice was mediated by 
pre-discussion preferences, and Hypothesis 4 is 
partially confi rmed: only pre-discussion pre-
ferences but not information exchange mediated 
the effect of condition on choice.
Post-discussion questionnaire
The extent to which new information came up 
during discussion was measured with two post-
discussion questionnaire items (Table 2). A 
one-way ANOVA showed a signifi cant effect of 
condition, F(2, 24) = 33.03, p < .001, η2 = .73. 
The full information condition (M = 2.33), 
where each group member had received the 
same complete set of information and no new 
information could enter the discussion, differed 
reliably from both the negative (M = 5.17) and 
the positive bias conditions (M = 6.07; Tukey 
post-hoc test, p < .001).
Candidate suitability ratings after the discussion 
are displayed in Table 3. These ratings were 
analysed with a 3 (condition) × 3 (candidate) 
mixed-model ANOVA. As was the case with 
the pre-discussion ratings, there was a main 
effect of condition, F(2, 27) = 7.89, p = .002, 
η2 = .37. Ratings were lower in the negative bias 
condition (M = 3.07) than in the full informa-
tion condition (M = 4.16) and the positive bias 
condition (M = 4.31; both p < .01 in a Tukey 
post-hoc test). There also was a candidate main 
effect, F(2, 26) = 5.52, p = .01, η2 = .30, showing 
that candidate A (M = 4.24) had higher ratings 
than candidate B (M = 3.56) and candidate C 
was in between (M = 3.74). The interaction 
between condition and candidate was marginally 
signifi cant, F(4, 52) = 2.26, p = .08, η2 = .15. As 
was the case with the pre-discussion ratings, the 
difference between conditions was signifi cant for 
candidate A, F(2, 27) = 7.30, p = .003, η2 = .35, 
and candidate C, F(2, 27) = 9.54, p = .001, 
η2 = .41, but not for candidate B, F(2, 27) = 0.51, 
p = .61, η2 = .04.
Because new negative information could only 
be mentioned in the positive bias condition and 
new positive information only in the negative 
bias condition, candidate ratings after discussion 
might have gone down relative to pre-discussion 
ratings in the positive bias condition and up in the 
negative bias condition. Therefore, a 3 (con-
dition) × 3 (candidate) × 2 (time: pre-discussion 
vs. post-discussion ratings) ANOVA, with the last 
two variables within groups, was performed.1 This 
analysis showed a marginally signifi cant main 
effect of time, F(1, 27) = 3.70, p = .07, η2 = .12. 
On average, ratings were slightly lower after the 
discussion (across all candidates M = 3.84) than 
before the discussion (M = 4.03). Importantly, 
the condition by time interaction was not sig-
nifi cant, F <  1, η2 = .06, which suggests that 
discussion did not impact candidate ratings 
very much. However, there was a marginally 
signifi cant candidate by time interaction, F(2, 
26) = 2.97, p = .07, η2 = .19, which was further 
qualifi ed by a marginally signifi cant candidate 
by time by condition interaction, F(4, 52) = 2.10, 
p = .09, η2 = .14. As can be seen in Table 3, ratings 
in general remained stable or went down slightly 
(especially in the positive bias condition), except 
for the ratings of candidate A in the negative 
bias condition. These ratings went up slightly. 
Table 3. Candidate ratings
Condition
Full information Positive bias Negative bias
Measure A B C A B C A B C
Pre-discussion ratings 4.60 3.93 4.46 5.22 4.14 4.59 2.92 3.51 2.86 
(.61) (.65) (.80) (.78) (.52) (.61) (.61) (.91) (.61)
Post-discussion ratings 4.60 3.80 4.08 4.90 3.53 4.50 3.23 3.33 2.63 
(.55) (.94) (1.18) (1.28) (.76) (.93) (1.14) (1.33) (.86)
Note : Standard deviations are in parentheses. A, B and C refer to candidates.
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It thus seems that new information brought 
up during discussion has had some impact on 
candidate ratings, but not much.
Agreement with the decision did not differ 
reliably across conditions. First, based on the post-
discussion questionnaires, I counted the number 
of group members that had the same post-
discussion preference as the group decision, 
and this did not differ across conditions, F < 1, 
η2 = .04. Most group members agreed with the 
decision (on average 2.65 of 3 group members 
had the same preference). I also analysed the 
ratings of decision agreement, and found no 
effect either, F < 1, η2 = .04. Agreement was quite 
high (M = 6.01 on a 7-point scale).
Additional analyses
The results thus far suggest that group choice was 
largely determined by pre-discussion preferences. 
Further, the new information that did come up 
during the discussion (in the positive and nega-
tive bias conditions) did not have much impact 
on choice. To further investigate the latter (lack 
of) effects, I looked at correlations between the 
process data (the sharing of information and 
attractions/aversions) and choice and post-
discussion candidate ratings.
The fi ndings were consistent with the general 
picture (see Table 4). The exchange of infor-
mation about particular candidates was not 
associated with choice (choice was dummy coded 
with 0, refusal and 1, choice), all –.26 < r < .24 
(all p > .15). Further, post-discussion candidate 
ratings also were not strongly associated with the 
information exchanged about these candidates. 
There only was one signifi cant correlation, which 
(surprisingly) was a positive correlation between 
the number of negative items of information 
exchanged about candidate C and ratings of C. 
Should this negative information have had any 
impact, the correlation should at least have been 
negative. However, as can be seen in Table 4, 
the exchange of attractions for a particular 
candidate was consistently associated with the 
ratings of that candidate (.53 < r < .65, p < .01). 
Further, only the exchange of attractions for 
candidate A was correlated with choice (r = .42, 
p = .02).
Discussion
Although many researchers have studied group 
decision making, the topic of group decisions 
that do not get made (with the exception of 
hung juries) has largely been ignored. In the 
present study, the effects of pre-discussion pre-
ferences and opinions on group decision refusal 
were investigated. Group decision refusal occurs 
when the group refuses to take any of the pre-
sently available options, but instead opts to 
Table 4. Correlations between process data and group decision and post-discussion candidate ratings 
(N = 29 groups)
Information/preference 
exchange
Choice 
(1 = choice)
Ratings of 
candidate A
Ratings of 
candidate B
Ratings of 
candidate C
Positive info A .24 .18 –.26 .16
Negative info A .21 .10 –.10 .31
Positive info B –.13 –.35† .10 –.12
Negative info B .05 –.12 .09 –.07
Positive info C –.26 –.09 –.25 .19
Negative info C .24 .26 .28 .48**
Attraction for A .42* .65*** .14 .33†
Aversion against A –.20 –.34† –.18 –.15
Attraction for B –.01 –.29 .56** –.15
Aversion against B .22 .17 –.15 .43*
Attraction for C .09 –.04 –.16 .54**
Aversion against C .16 .08 .33† –.31†
Note : † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. For clarity, correlations between process data and 
corresponding candidate ratings are bold.
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invest further resources to identify more options. 
Three conditions were created, differing in the 
way information was distributed among group 
members, to manipulate pre-discussion opinions 
towards decision alternatives. Specifi cally, a full 
information condition was compared with a 
positive bias condition (positive information was 
given to all group members, negative information 
was distributed among the members) and a 
negative bias condition (negative information 
was given to all members, positive information 
was distributed among the members).
The main fi nding from this experiment is that 
when group members enter a discussion with 
a negative view on all available options ( job 
candidates, in this case), the group is likely 
not to select any of them, even if information 
is present that would suggest that the options 
are not as bad as they fi rst seemed. Thus, most 
groups (80%) in the full information condi-
tion did make a choice, indicating that on the 
whole the candidates were perceived to be 
adequate. However, groups in the negative bias 
condition were not very likely to adjust their 
initial negative views, and therefore remained 
rather negative and often (60%) decided against 
all candidates.
The negative view of all candidates in the 
negative bias condition persisted despite the fact 
that, according to both the self-reports and the 
analysis of video recordings, new information 
came up during discussion. As new informa-
tion in that condition was always positive, it 
should have led to an increase in candidate 
ratings. However, this new information did not 
affect group member’s liking of the options 
much and had no relation with group choice. 
Therefore, the negative opinions persisted and 
pre-discussion preferences in favour of refusal 
could explain the effects of condition on group 
choice. This finding is consistent with the 
common knowledge effect (Gigone & Hastie, 
1993, 1997): shared negative information in 
the negative bias condition had more impact 
on choice than unshared positive information 
because: (i) it had more impact on pre-discussion 
preferences, and (ii) it led to a biased evaluation of 
new (positive) information.
Correlational analyses further showed that 
information exchange in general was not asso-
ciated with choice or post-discussion ratings 
of the candidates. However, the exchange of 
preferences was: the number of times a statement 
was made in favour of a particular candidate was 
positively correlated with the ratings for that 
candidate. This further corroborates the idea 
that choice was largely based on the pooling 
of preferences, rather than on the systematic 
consideration of information. Related to this, 
Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington (1983), in 
the context of jury decision making, suggested 
the distinction between ‘verdict-driven’ and 
‘evidence-driven’ jury decision strategies. A 
verdict-driven strategy (or more generally: a 
‘preference-driven’ strategy) implies frequent 
polling and decisions based on initial group 
member preferences, while an ‘evidence-driven’ 
strategy (or ‘information-driven’ strategies) 
implies the exchange and elaboration of 
decision-relevant information and a decision 
based upon the available information (also 
De Dreu, Nijstad, & van Knippenberg, 2008; 
Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003). Groups in this 
study can clearly be characterized as ‘preference 
driven’ rather than ‘information driven’. Further, 
a preference-driven strategy was maladaptive, 
because it prevented groups from discovering 
that the candidates were not as bad as initially 
believed.
Surprisingly, no evidence was found for a 
systematic bias in the information that was 
exchanged. Thus, unlike has been found in much 
previous work (Larson et al., 1994; Stasser & 
Titus, 1985), there was no evidence for shared 
information (positive information in the positive 
bias condition, negative information in the neg-
ative bias condition) to be discussed more than 
unshared information. Partly, I suspect, this is 
due to the relatively few items of information 
that were used (six items per candidate), as it has 
previously been shown that the bias is stronger 
when information load is higher (Stasser & Titus, 
1987). In another study with the same paradigm 
(Nijstad & Kaps, 2008), a bias in information 
sharing with a higher information load (eight 
items per candidate) was found. It might also be 
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possible that adding a refusal option to the choice 
set changes the normal discussion patterns. For 
example, in the negative bias condition group 
members will have considered the refusal option 
and might have tried to argue against that, using 
(unshared) positive information.
Implications, limitations and future 
directions
To date, the work on group indecision (i.e. cases 
in which groups do not reach a decision) has 
mostly been limited to work on hung juries. In 
that literature, almost by defi nition, opinion 
diversity (i.e. jurors who favour guilty as well 
as jurors who favour not guilty) is an import-
ant determinant of the failure to reach a ver-
dict. More particularly, if jurors hold different 
opinions, and they do not give in, the jury 
might be hung (also see Nijstad & Kaps, 2008). 
Here, another determinant was identified: 
initial negative opinions about the different 
alternatives.
The fi nding that initial negative opinions 
persist despite positive information becom-
ing available during discussion, and that this 
might lead the group to refuse all available 
alternatives, potentially has some important 
implications. Although I am not aware of any 
systematic research on this topic, common 
experience suggests that groups often fail to 
commit themselves to a particular alternative. 
When several or even all group members (as in 
the present study) are relatively negative about 
currently available alternatives, and there is no 
real pressure to come to a decision, this, accord-
ing to the present fi ndings, is a likely result. 
Groups will perhaps even refuse to choose when 
only one or a few members are negative about 
all options. When groups strive for unanimity, 
even a small minority of group members might 
veto all decisions, which would lead to decision 
refusal. Indeed, I found that in about one-third 
of the groups in which one of three members 
initially favoured decision refusal no choice was 
made. As noted earlier, this is not necessarily 
maladaptive (e.g. bad decision options should 
be refused), but it can lead to real costs when 
a decision should be made quickly or when 
adequate alternatives are rejected.
Related to that last point, an important limit-
ation of the present study should be noted. 
Group choice had no real implications for group 
members. Thus, although it was emphasized that 
refusal in real life is costly, groups could refuse all 
options without their choice negatively affecting 
any real outcomes. However, this was true for 
all conditions, so differences among conditions 
cannot be attributed to this. Furthermore, in 
real life many decisions might not necessarily be 
costly for the people taking them (e.g. the 
selection committee), but rather for the organ-
izations as a whole. Although these considerations 
suggest that the present results may generalize to 
real life situations, it is nevertheless important 
to establish whether the present fi ndings extend 
to choices that do have real consequences.
Another limitation of the present study relates 
to sample size. With only 10 groups in each con-
dition some effects might have failed to reach 
conventional levels of signifi cance because of 
lack of statistical power. In particular, the results 
regarding information exchange, the exchange 
of preferences and discussion time might 
have been stronger with a larger sample size. 
However, as group choice was mainly driven by 
pre-discussion preferences, I do not expect quali-
tatively different results with a larger sample.
Several other issues might be interesting to 
pursue. For example, the no choice option in 
this experiment was to refuse all alternatives and 
look for more options. It might be the case that 
this type of no choice has other determinants 
than other types of no choice, such as delaying a 
decision in order to search for more information 
about available alternatives (rather than looking 
for new ones). For example, search for more 
information might be the preferred option 
when current alternatives are close in attract-
iveness, and it is diffi cult to choose among them 
(cf. Tversky & Shafi r, 1992; Dhar, 1997). Future 
work may study this in a group context.
Other interesting issues might be to study 
factors that we know have an impact on group 
decision making, including leadership (Larson, 
Foster-Fishman, & Franz, 1998), time pressure 
(Kelly & Loving, 2004) and explicit decision 
rules (i.e. unanimity required; Stasson, Kameda, 
Parks, Zimmerman, & Davis, 1991; also Kerr & 
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MacCoun, 1985). Some of these factors may 
increase or decrease the group’s reliance on 
preference- versus information-driven inter-
action (also see De Dreu et al., 2008). For 
example, time pressure leads to shorter discus-
sion, and perhaps to more preference-driven 
decision strategies, as this is a quick way to 
come to a decision. However, effective leaders 
might stimulate information elaboration, and 
thus lead to more information-driven decision 
strategies. In a context in which a preference-
driven interaction may lead to decision refusal, 
such as in the present study, leadership might 
reduce refusal, whereas time pressure might 
increase it.
Conclusion
All in all, this study suggests that initial negative 
views about decision options might not easily 
be corrected when other group members provide 
new positive information during discussion. 
Rather, this information is evaluated in a biased 
way, and group members remain negative about 
the options. In turn, when this is possible, it often 
leads groups to refuse all options, even though 
as a whole the options may be adequate. There-
fore, the present research extends fi ndings on 
the common knowledge effect—the effect that 
shared information has more impact on group 
choice than unshared information—by showing 
that under certain conditions this bias may lead 
groups to not decide at all.
Note
1. There also was a main effect of condition, 
F (2, 27) = 16.78, p < .001, a main effect of 
candidate, F (2, 26) = 4.54, p = .02, and a 
candidate by condition interaction, 
F (4, 52) = 2.83, p = .03. These have already 
been discussed in the descriptions of the 
univariate ANOVAs.
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